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From the Editor:

As you all know, the SPSP2020 meeting at Michigan State University has been postponed one year, until 7-9 July 2021, due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Until we meet again, we hope that the newsletter can help us stay connected.

In the last volume we initiated a new thematic section on the implications of the “practice turn” in philosophy of science. In #12, Martin Zach interviewed Nora Boyd from Sienna College. In this volume, Adrian Currie from Exeter will give his view on the practice turn.

If you are wondering what the picture on the frontpage is all about, you can learn more about Ideobics in the article “Health Publics in Personalized Medicine” in our Talk of the town section. In these times, we may need mind-body exercises more than ever. We also report from three other meetings – on Philosophical Perspectives on Ecological Niches, Animal Research Unbound, and LEAHPS.

You can also solve the SPSP Riddle and enjoy reading the Proust Questionnaire, this time answered by Katie Kendig from Michigan State University.

On behalf of the editorial team,

Sara

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MZ: How would you describe your own work in terms of its relation to “practice”?

AC: SPSP folk often contrast ‘practice’ with ‘theory’, but this excludes practices like theorizing, modeling and so on: there are plenty of theoretical practices. I think we should understand scientific practice in terms of processes which generate products. To a large extent, the philosophy of science has focused on scientific products: that is, considering scientific theories, hypotheses and models in static terms, partially abstracted from the processes producing them. This lends itself to epistemic questions considering the relationship between, for instance, scientific representations and the world, or how best to interpret those products, or the metaphysical consequences of taking them seriously. Going process-first both transforms these questions and raises new ones. Considering how experiments are designed, built and run, following the journey subsequent data takes; or the conceiving, constructing and tweaking of models; or the complex negotiations involved in writing papers and navigating publication—and following the debates those publications themselves generate—tend towards more local, detailed answers to philosophical questions.

So, my work’s commitment to ‘practice’ involves attention to the processes by which scientists generate knowledge. I’m ultimately asking a traditional philosophy-of-science question: how come science is so successful? But the turn to practice transforms this question: what strategies do scientists adopt in light of the epistemic situations they face? My method typically involves examining case studies in a fair bit of detail, and from this abstracting normative lessons about those strategies. For instance, I’ve recently argued that paleontologists’ apparent focus on simple, one-shot explanations can be understood as providing crucial scaffolding for eventually constructing more complex (and
likely) explanations of events in the deep past.

MZ: What kind of “practice” do you think philosophers should pay more attention to and why?

AC: First, fieldwork. There’s quite a bit of work on experimental practices, and people like Sabina Leonelli have spearheaded attention to data-journeys, how data is processed and re-contextualized once it has been generated. But for the scientists I focus on (paleontology and archaeology for instance) the field is a critical place for knowledge generation, interpretation, and the formation of cohesive research groups. Just as experiments and data often have ‘lives of their own’ so too do some field sites. The second chapter of Bob Chapman and Alison Wylie’s Evidential Reasoning in Archaeology is a good start; I’ve dipped my toe into fieldwork in this little post for Extinct, the philosophy of paleontology blog. Second, the context of pursuit: how do scientists decide which investigations to conduct, which hypotheses to chase up, which techniques to utilize and develop, and so on? I’m fascinated by the strategies scientists adopt here, and they raise some important epistemic questions that we’ve only just started to uncover.

MZ: A legitimate worry may be that, notwithstanding an effort to master a scientific field, philosophers simply are not scientists and the perspectives they bring are thus doomed to be shallow. Does a middle way exist?

AC: I don’t think there’s a “middle-way” in the implied sense. Philosophers are different from scientists—we have differing sets of tools and interests. The idea that only practicing scientists can have something deep to say about science belittles the insights that anthropologists, historians, sociologists and—yeah at least sometimes—philosophers have. First off, not all philosophers are so ‘outside’ of science, many of us have scientific training and careers as scientists (Martin Rudwick, for instance, did quite important research as a paleontologist before his influential work in the history and philosophy of the earth sciences). Second, why would an ‘outside’ perspective be therefore shallow? Scientists (all academics really) often do a lot of gatekeeping, typically to try and retain control of the discourse around their topics (and fair enough I guess, they’ve been burnt before!) and this often involving asserting their having privileged, perhaps the only legitimate, perspective on science. But science is a complex, multi-faceted human endeavor. Such a thing must be understood from multiple perspectives. Third and finally, I’ve done a fair bit of both formal and informal work with scientists, and often the interactions are extremely fruitful in both directions. This doesn’t so much involve as finding a ‘middle-way’ as it does bringing our varying capacities and interests into dialogue (I’m perhaps most proud of this paper, which includes amongst its authors three philosophers and nine scientists…). established results.

The main hurdle in working with philosophers on biological concepts is that philosophers (in comparison to biologists or geometers) tend to be less visual in expressing their ideas and often work without making any images at all. This is reflected in the lack of familiarity and confidence that philosophers also tend to have with drawing and this can make it more difficult to construct image concepts and analogies to think with together.

MZ: What kind of challenges do you find most difficult to overcome when engaging in the philosophy of science in practice?

AC: I suppose balancing highly detailed science with philosophical analysis can make keeping one’s papers to a decent length really tricky… But I think the real challenges are to do with philosophy more generally. The philosophy of science in practice quite often looks pretty alien to traditional analytic philosophers who are used to more generalized, abstract and argumentative approaches—that stuff is no doubt present in practice-orientated work, but it takes time to learn to spot it. This means that it can be very difficult for science-in-practice folks to be taken seriously as philosophers, and this is particularly difficult for younger scholars who face a lot of pressure to publish in fancy generalist journals and get jobs in generalist philosophy departments. The practice-orientated folks are, let’s face it, often in competition with more traditional philosophers of science whose work looks more philosophical to those making decisions about hiring (we philosophers are certainly not immune to gatekeeping either…). This doesn’t
mean that more traditional work is bad (I often quite like it and find my interactions with analytic philosophers, and not just those interested in science, incredibly productive) nor that one can't build a career focused on practice (I've been very lucky indeed on that front—although not without my share of setbacks), but I think we should be thinking hard about how to foster spaces for practice-oriented philosophy of science (of course the SPSP is a fantastic example of this), normalizing it amongst philosophy more generally and, in particular, supporting early career folk who have an interest in practice.

Adrian Currie is the author of Rock, Bone and Ruin (MIT Press) and has just published a new book entitled Scientific Knowledge and the Deep Past (Cambridge University Press)

SPSP Riddle: Match the Words to their Speakers!

It is that act of speech of “talking back” that is no mere gesture of empty words, that is the expression of our movement from object to subject—the liberated voice.

Bertrand Russell, The Conquest of Happiness

In adolescence, I hated life and was continually on the verge of suicide, from which, however, I was restrained by the desire to know more mathematics.

bell hooks, Talking Back

The ability to invent new goals is limited by the existence of already defined groups... At first sight, it seems impossible to invent new groups; in practice, it is the easiest and by far the most efficient strategy.

Nancy Cartwright, The Dappled World

Narratives make ethical principles real. They capture the joys and struggles within and among us. They give us models for living.

Kristin Shrader-Fechette, Taking Action Saving Lives

What is important about capacities is their open-endedness: what we know about them suggests strategies rather than underwriting conclusions, as a vending-machine view of science would require.

Bruno Latour, Science in Action
The ecological niche is a key concept for capturing the complex interactions and interdependencies between organisms and their environment. With a contested history of different understandings and an ambiguous place in present ecological and evolutionary research, the niche concept demands philosophical attention. The first philosophy workshop of the Collaborative Research Centre (CRC) TRR-212 “A Novel Synthesis of Individualisation across Behaviour, Ecology and Evolution: Niche Choice, Niche Conformance, Niche Construction (NC3)” provided the space to engage in a much-needed dialogue about ecological niches.

A key goal of the workshop was to clarify and sharpen the niche concept for the CRC’s further theoretical and empirical work. Topics included the nature and ontological status of ecological niches, the different niche concepts in the history of ecology, applications of the niche concept in ecology, conservation biology, and stem cell biology, the kinds of fitness that are relevant for ecological niches, and the notion of an individualised niche.

Four international philosophers of biology—Antoine C. Dussault, Alkistis Elliott-Graves, Alan Love and James Justus—joined ecologists and philosophers from the CRC to present talks and facilitate discussion. The workshop was attended by a number of biologists from the CRC, as well as several local and international philosophy students. The interdisciplinary group meant that many perspectives were present, but the central questions about ecological niches ensured discussions were always productive and interesting for all involved.

Alongside talks, the workshop included some participatory activities. The knowledge café was especially exciting for participants, providing a space for small group work with some empirical input. Five questions about niches were on offer for participants to discuss based on results from a questionnaire conducted with members of the CRC. The presence of biologists and philosophers of biology together made for a lively debate about how to define niches and whether they are real. A closing discussion on the second day with all participants of the workshop provided a space for collecting and reflecting on the central ideas.

The workshop was organised by Ulrich Krohs, Marie I. Kaiser, Behzad Nematipour, and Rose Trappes. Financial support was provided by the DFG as part of the funding for the CRC TRR-212, and organisational support and the location was provided by the Department of Philosophy at the University of Münster. Thanks are due to all participants and speakers for their dedicated and valuable contributions. For more information and to keep up to date with the research of the CRC, visit the website: here.
Animal Research Unbound Conference 2019 – Exeter

Elis Jones

On 15th-16th July 2019, the Exeter Centre for the Study of the Life Science at the Exeter University hosted the Animal Research Unbound conference. The meeting was a collaborative effort bringing together the Organisms and Us project (funded by the Australian Research Council) and the Animal Nexus project (funded by the Wellcome Trust). It offered insight into research which reappraises the boundaries at work in animal research – whether they are disciplinary, organismal, physical, regulatory or ethical. The conference featured work from many disciplines, countries and institutions, and was co-organised by Sabina Leonelli, Gail Davies (both of the University of Exeter), Rachel Ankeny (University of Adelaide), and Rob Kirk (University of Manchester).

Over the two days there were a range of talks as well as an interactive poster-timeline for attendees to add what they found to be key historical animal research events. Talks brought the boundaries of the laboratory into question – discussing research on and protection of wild animals, such
as the surveillance of wild hamsters and ‘problem foxes’ in the Netherlands. The laboratory-patient boundary was examined in the involvement of patients in shaping animal research, along with the anxieties and responsibilities that come with this. Shifting human-animal boundaries, and species boundaries generally, were explored in relation to the traffic of genetic information between humans and pigs, neurodegenerative research in dogs, and personalised medicine’s attempt to create “mouse avatars” containing patient-specific tumour cells. Heteronormative assumptions in research design were challenged by new understandings of animal sexuality. Several presentations exposed the complex negotiation of legislative and ethical boundaries associated with animal research – such as the passing of the 1986 Animals Scientific Procedures Act, the badger bovine TB controversy, and interaction of social and animal sentience in forming UK animal regulation – all of which involve elaborate balancing acts of multiple stakeholders, social concerns, and technical expertise.

The demands of the practices associated with scientific research and living subjects were present throughout – surfacing prominently in discussions of research repertoires, scientific and organismal reproduction and the multiple roles for care. Intended and unintended consequences of the three Rs (reduce, refine, replace) for animal research and its human practitioners played a key role in discussion. The three Rs drive demands for new animal practices, and effective communication of existing ones, but also bump up against a variety of socio-epistemic barriers. The epistemic properties of animals and the material circumstances they are wrapped up in played a critical part in understanding the past and future of research.

A closing panel synthesised the lessons from taking an unbounded and decentred approach to animal research. Some important themes here were the multiple ways interspecies relations operate; different forms and contexts of care, affect and responsibility and the ever-blurrier boundaries of the organism. Increased focus on (and multiple meanings of) the environment also appeared as an important part of understanding animal research. By looking at unorthodox or surprising animal research and research communities, and reappraising traditional ones, conference participants helped construct a number of unbounded perspectives on what it means for humans and animals to interact.

More information on the conference and the talks can be found here.
LEAHPS II Leibniz University Hannover, 25-27 July 2019

Sophia Efstathiou and Vlasta Sikimić

Learning from Empirical Approaches to History and Philosophy of Science (LEAHPS) is a conference series that brings together empirical (qualitative and quantitative) and interdisciplinary approaches to philosophy of science. The first LEAHPS was organized in 2018 at the Center for Philosophy of Science of the University of Pittsburgh. The second LEAHPS meeting was held at the Leibniz University Hannover last summer and brought together scholars working within and across philosophy, history, and psychology of science, who use both empirical and formal methods.

Indeed, the conference had three big themes: experiences within laboratories, qualitative methods, and formal models in philosophy of science. The conference was structured to have talks, commentaries and joint discussions after each session.

The programme started with two keynotes dedicated to the experiences of philosophers within scientific laboratories. Joyce Havstad spoke of the difficulties of managing uncertainty and values in communicating findings of early hominid paleontology to a broader public. Sophia Efstathiou shared an exciting but also dramatic story from her ethnographic study of the normative conflicts that biomedical researchers working with animal experiments face. In the end, participants in the study had a change of heart about making the findings public for fear of being identified, flagging the difficulty of ensuring anonymization and informed consent in the context of ethnographic research. Petr Jedlička presented his empirical research, co-authored with Jitka Paitlová, on how scientists perceive the concept of objectivity. The talk demonstrated another way in which philosophical questions might be illuminated by empirical research.

The three presentations that followed that afternoon enriched our perspectives on how philosophers could work on the boundary but also within scientific projects. In his keynote, Jesse Wright discussed his experience as a philosopher working with a Stanford team of scientists specialized in cognitive neuroscience modeling. Deborah Kant brought philosophy of mathematics into the discussion, analyzing how philosophical and empirical accounts of truth might relate to mathematical ones. Brian Robinson presented the work of the Toolbox Method for empirical philosophy of science, outlining the project’s approach of mapping the epistemological and ontological divergences among different scientific and disciplinary teams. A panel presentation brought the different approaches together, with presenters discussing the role of philosophy with regard to science, and the risks and benefits of integrating philosophy with scientific practices.

The second day started with a keynote by Hanne Andersen who surveyed work in philosophy leading to the field of empirical philosophy of science arguing in favor of mixed methods in philosophy of science. Mixed methodology in this context refers to the application of formal models, as well as qualitative and quantitative techniques coming from philosophy, history, sociology, and psychology of science. This was followed by the keynote of Miles MacLeod, who argued for a ‘cognitive ethnography’ of science, i.e., for using ethnographic methods to analyze how scientists think, or how scientific ideas and theories develop. The conference Chair, Nora Hangel, presented the results of an extensive qualitative study conducted together with Jutta Schickore on epistemic and organizational practices across scientific disciplines, including participants’ reports on scientific misconduct. Talks by Thomas Bonnin and Dominic Berry both emphasized the importance of historical research as an already empirical dimension within HPS. Berry emphasized that using diverse methodologies does not necessarily provide a better grounding for philosophy, but that these methodologies will offer different ways of answering philosophical questions.
After lunchtime workshop attendants were invited to an exercise led by Sophia Efstathiou as part of her work on doing philosophy through performance versus discussion and argumentation. The exercise, called the Response-able Walk, was made of a sequence of instructions given to participants with the aim of creating an emergent pattern which no one anticipated, nor intended, as an invitation to reflect on the role and nature of responsibility (as individual or collective, as attributability or as accountability) in big social projects like scientific research.

The theme of using computational methods in the study of science was explored through four presentations on the last day, starting with the keynotes of Dunja Šešelja and Colin Allen. Šešelja argued that through idealizing and abstract Agent-Based Modeling (ABM), one can account for how socio-epistemic factors may affect the growth of scientific knowledge – a method to be used and supplemented by standard historical and philosophical research. Collin Allen followed, with a talk on the use of ‘topic modeling’ as part of HPS work. Allen detailed a collaborative project, currently analyzing text to track the connections, and streams of influence between Darwin’s writings and the sources he appears to have read. The models allow for formal tracing of keywords and ideas from the literature and their interplay with scientific discoveries. Vlasta Šikimić discussed building models based on interviews with scientists to capture their preferences on scientific team structure, in terms of hierarchy and diversity. Jamie Shaw discussed a collaborative project with Hakob Barseghyan to develop a new workflow for science that would take place centered in an online encyclopedia – with contributors discussing and debating each others’ inputs, translated into and from publications, online and in real time.

All participants enjoyed the enthusiastic and at times more heated exchanges (and not only because this happened to be in the middle of a heatwave in Germany). Participants discussed the roles and purposes of their approaches and concluded that these can be methodological, but can also be actively engaged with scientific practices and science policy.

We wish all the success to this conference series!
Collaborative NOS-HS workshop in Copenhagen: Health Publics in the Context of Personalized Medicine

Sara Green and Sophia Efstatiou

On October 24-25, the workshop “Health Publics in the Context of Personalized Medicine” was held in Copenhagen. It brought together participants from Finland, Austria, Norway, Iceland, Spain, the Netherlands, Germany and Denmark to explore common research interests concerning what is often termed as the “data-driven future” of health care systems. The workshop explored how strategies of “personalization” relate to (and depend on) the collective of “health publics” in terms of data populations and patient groups. The workshop was financed by a NOS-HS Workshop grant (PI: Karoliina Snell, University of Helsinki) and by the Carlsberg-financed research project MeInWe (Personalized Medicine in the Welfare State, PI: Mette Nordahl Svendsen, University of Copenhagen).

The focus of this brief workshop report will be on the format of the workshop which we found to be stimulating. Mette N. Svendsen opened the meeting by emphasizing that the aim was to “contaminate” different research projects with ideas from others and inviting participants to share their first thoughts upon waking up that morning—a brilliant if not somewhat embarrassing ice-breaker. The workshop continued to surprise and stimulate us into thought. The day was kicked off by a keynote lecture by Barbara Prainsack (University of Vienna), co-hosted also by the Centre for Medical Science and Technology studies, University of Copenhagen. For the workshop participants, the keynote talk was followed by a creative exercise called Thought Lab. Each participant was given the task to write thoughts on Barbara’s talk on big post-its, which were then used for further group discussion. This gave participants more time to reflect on key points in the talk and to relate these to their own work.
Another creative event was an introduction to Sophia Efstathiou’s (NTNU) concept of Ideobics, i.e. a choreography combining physical exercises with positive ideas. It is inspired by Jane Fonda’s aerobics and provides an opportunity to not only use workshops to exercise the mind, but the mind and body combined. Ideobics invites participants to ten exercises connecting parts of the body, like the head, neck, shoulders, arms, hands, chest, hips and feet, with ‘positive’ concepts, taken to align with or symbolize parts of the body: for instance chest and love. Participants are guided through the physical movement while speaking the concept which the movement is meant to exercise.

Refreshed by the Ideobics exercise, participants engaged in a stimulating keynote by Professor Ulrik Lassen, from the University Hospital Rigshospitalet, who gave insights into how personalized medicine is implemented in the oncology clinic he is the head of. The afternoon session was a Datalab where four workshop participants presented empirical results of their current research (Birgit Wouters, Line Hillersdal, Matthias Braun, and Clémence Pinel). A Datalab is an approach often used in the social sciences to get inputs on the interpretation of transcripts from interviews and field notes, but which may also be used by philosophers of science relying on empirical methods. In this format the talks were kept to a 7 min presentation plus 7 min feedback time.

The Danish philosopher Kierkegaard famously developed his ideas while walking in Copenhagen, and the second day started with a Walk and Talk to follow this tradition. In this context, however, it was not a lone philosopher walking, but us discussing in pairs, so as to facilitate the “contamination” of our research ideas and concepts. While we often develop theories by focusing on similarities, with inspiration from Mandy de Wilde at the University of Amsterdam, the task here was to use contrasting as an analytical technique to explore how research ideas can develop from the articulation of difference.

Thought Lab: Participants write down thoughts following Prainsack’s keynote as starting point for further discussion. This format supplemented relying on questions as a sole format for engaging with the keynote, and enabled people who for one or another reason might not have raised a question to express and share their thoughts with others.

The art of ideobics: Exercising the ideas of ‘ease’ and ‘elegance’ matched to the fingers and hands.
within the participant’s own research. Participant gathered in pairs and distributed 20 minutes to each member. After 40 minutes, new pairs were formed. As a result of this workshop, surprising connections were identified by contrasts (and tensions) that came up in the various projects. Combining physical movement with thought and discussion made for a lively format of engagement and took us through some beautiful fall landscapes in Copenhagen.

The second day included three talks. First a presentation by Sophia Efstathiou (NTNU) on the construction of biomedical ‘knowledge commons’ focusing on the role and status of people curating the databases. After the lunch break, Heta Tarkkala (University of Helsinki) gave a presentation of how the population(s) of Finnish biobanks are framed as homogenous or stratified in different contexts. Finally, Ingrid Metzler (University of Vienna) offered insights into what she called the “multiple worlds” of cell free fetal DNA testing in care practices in Austria. The workshop ended with reflections on what participants learned throughout the workshop and several highlighted that the non-traditional formats used had been refreshing. We hope this short report can inspire the organization of future workshops on philosophy of science in practice which employ and experiment with these or new formats.
**Who are your favourite heroes or heroines? In real life or in fiction.**

James Bond. It’s kind of embarrassing as there’s so much inappropriateness about him, but when I was younger I especially adored the newsreel-like chase scenes across icy slopes and the underwater marine cave grottos of the cold war villians. I really wanted to be Bond. The character also ignited my early fascination of all things Russian, inspired an interest in Russian history, a short stint of scuba (dreaming of being a SEAL), and a summer study abroad trip my final year of high school.

**What is your favourite food?**

It’s got to be my mother’s raspberry pie and anything she helped me forage; like fiddleheads, chanterelles, sulfer shelf mushrooms, ramps, and stream-gathered watercress. My parents encouraged my local and global gastronautical approach to food. Whenever I travel I seek out what is unique, tasty, and local. This has meant samphire and elvers in Exeter; haggis in Durness; Indonesian Rijsttafel in The Hague; New England clam bakes in Westport; pit-smoked BBQ in Kansas City; and perogies in Pittsburgh.

**What is the most critical academic or non-academic feedback you ever received?**

I once had a philosopher of physics repeatedly ask me to ‘just explain the species problem using quarks instead of biology examples’. When I told him I could try, but it really wouldn’t preserve the problem as it was in situ, he responded by saying ‘you’re not really doing philosophy then, are you?’ Years later I ran into him at a conference and he greeted me with, ‘you are, literally, the last person I thought I’d see here!’ I was there because I was being awarded Honorable Mention for the APA Article Prize for a paper that I’m sure he would say wasn’t philosophy.

**Which word or phrase do you overuse?**

It’s not so much words or phrases, it’s the use of metaphors especially those pertaining to food. I recently explained Feyerabend’s anarchistic science in terms of swapping the lab’s PCR for a sous vide machine. I’m also prone to portmanteau words (see below).

**Where do you write your best work?**

On my sofa at home in absolute silence. I tend to have periods of hyper-focus where there is no other thing in the world except me and my thoughts. It’s not quite the single-mindedness of Captain Ahab, but close. Other times, even the soft rattle of the water pipes distracts me as I want to figure out what key they’re playing in.

**What is your favourite entertainment?**

Watching an opera complete with full pit orchestra from the upper balcony, so that I am close enough to peer at the French horns. I used to play when I was younger, so it always makes me think I should start practicing again. I also love the intimacy of fringe theatre performances where the actors’ wilder gesticulations threaten to brush your face, and site-specific immersive theatre with lots of improvisation.
What profession would you like to attempt besides your own?

A surgeon. It combines analytic diagnoses, problem-solving, learning through doing, and helping people. Those are of course also the things that made me fall in love with philosophy of science in practice. But surgery is more crafty, and the ontological messiness would be on my hands rather than in my head. I’ve always been inspired by my uncle who’s a neurosurgeon and I initially pursued biology (pre-med) as an undergrad at Syracuse. That this is an utterly preposterous profession to ‘attempt’ is not lost on me.

What is your most treasured possession?

My grandfather’s first edition of Moby Dick with Rockwell Kent’s woodcut illustrations.

Where were or are you happiest?

During my long run, hiking along the coast, or meandering through the countryside. There’s a local coffee roaster nearby where I live and the smell of it wafting through the air at the beginning of my morning run is such a treat. I often use running as a way to map new cities with my feet, especially when I’m at conferences. On a recent early morning run through Prague, I found the Charles bridge before the tourists, a mountainside funicular, and discovered a hidden castle.

What is your greatest achievement?

Figuring out how to have a job that allows me to do what I love, work with amazing collaborators, and be able to pass on a passion for philosophy to my students feels like an achievement. But it’s one that I can only do when I also have time to spend with friends and loved ones and occasionally walk through the fields of cotton on our family farm in Missouri.

Answers to Newsletter #12 Puzzle

Across

3. The biases that keep women out of philosophy can be this. (implicit)
5. Mice who live in the lab (organisms)
8. Composite word from the Greek for 'being' and 'reason' (ontology)

Down

1. Knowing how often is this. (tact)
2. Empirical philosophy of science uses this (ethnography)
4. Louis Pasteur emphasized the prepared mind, and Guy Debord ‘goal-less drifting’ as important for what? (discovery)
6. Not a meme (gene)
7. What comes out of a bell, and a valid argument with true premises (sound)